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Abstract 
 
THE ROLE OF BIASED SEARCHING THROUGH MEMORY IN 
MOTIVATED SOCIAL EVALUATION 
 
Anastasia Elena Rigney, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Jennifer S. Beer 
 
People do not always perceive their social world dispassionately; they often 
engage in motivated social evaluation. That is, people often do not evaluate themselves or 
other people objectively, but rather in a way that conforms to how they want to see the 
social target (i.e., a desired directional conclusion). For example, research shows that 
people tend to see themselves and liked others in an unrealistically positive light (Kruger, 
1999; Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Several researchers have posited 
biased searches through memory as an underlying mechanism supporting the 
phenomenon of seeing people in a certain light (Showers & Cantor, 1985; Kunda, 1990, 
Dunning, 2015). That is, it has been suggested that when aiming to paint a social target in 
a certain light people search through their memories or beliefs in ways that help them 
find information to support their desired directional conclusion. However, the methods 
used in existing research have made it difficult to understand if social evaluations that 
have been labeled as motivated actually reflect people striving for desired directional 
conclusions and what role biased memory searches may play. The proposed dissertation 
research addresses two overarching questions to understand the role of biased searches 
 vii 
through memory in social evaluation. Research Question 1: What is the role of a) biased 
searches through memory and b) directional conclusions in the greater reported memory 
for positive self-relevant feedback (compared to negative self-relevant feedback; Studies 
1, 2, & 3)? Research Question 2: Does biased searching through memory operate 
similarly when aiming to paint someone in a particular light (regardless of the directional 
conclusion) or only in a flattering light (Study 4)? A combination of experimental, 
neuroimaging (i.e., Event Related Potential), and computational modeling (i.e., Signal 
Detection Theory and Drift Diffusion Model) methods are used to address these 
questions. 
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OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
People often do not see their social world as it is, but rather, the way they want to 
see it. Prior beliefs or expectations can shape the way information is processed about a 
social target. One prevalent example is the extent to which people sometimes have rose-
colored glasses about the self and liked others (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 
2004). The processes by which people evaluate social targets in overly positive ways 
manifest in many different domains including memory distortions (Sedikides & Green, 
2009) and statistically unlikely personality judgments (Alicke, 1985). Despite many years 
of research exploring the phenomenon of motivated social evaluation, there is limited 
evidence supporting some of the underlying mechanisms that have been posited. 
Motivated social evaluation: In what ways do people paint social targets 
in a positive or negative light? 
Motivated social evaluation occurs when people's social evaluations are driven by 
a specific goal of how they want to view a social target (Showers & Cantor, 1985; Kunda, 
1990, Dunning, 2015). For example, motivated social evaluations are theorized to arise 
when people have already made up their minds about their conclusion (i.e., have a 
desired directional conclusion) before they start to evaluate a social target. The literature 
finds robust effects for social evaluations that are theorized to reflect the posited role of 
desired directional conclusions in social evaluation. For example, people's desire to see 
themselves in a positive light is theorized to explain why they tend to remember positive, 
personal feedback at a greater rate than negative, personal feedback (Sedikides & Green, 
2009), they are more likely to recall memories that support the claim that they possess 
desirable traits (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990), and they more readily forget past 
unethical behaviors they have perpetrated (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016).  Additionally, 
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people tend to disproportionately report self-evaluations and evaluations of liked others 
that are flattering when compared to evaluations of other people or objective markers 
(Kruger, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988). For example, evaluations 
of Obama and Trump depend on the evaluator’s political values (Pew Research Center, 
2016). More specifically, personality characterizations are consistent with the idea that 
people seek to confirm positive views to the extent that the political figure shares a 
political affiliation with the evaluator (and vice versa). 
Underlying mechanisms: The role of biased searching through memory 
in motivated social evaluations 
How are people able to paint social targets in a positive or negative light? Several 
theories have posited that a biased search through memory is one cognitive process that 
may support motivated social evaluation (Showers & Cantor, 1985; Kunda, 1990, 
Dunning, 2015).  That is, people may search their existing memories when they are 
making social evaluations and this cognitive process can become biased when they apply 
different rules or standards for searching through their memories to support their desired 
directional conclusions. From this perspective, people's tendency to remember flattering 
personal feedback at a greater rate may reflect their motivation or desire to see 
themselves in a positive light (i.e., self-enhancement). Further, people may accomplish 
this difference in memory by having different standards for an internal sense of 
familiarity with positive, self-relevant memories before claiming recognition as compared 
to negative self-relevant memories. The role of biased searches through memory may 
also account for people's tendency to make flattering evaluations of themselves and 
people they like. That is, when evaluating a liked social target they may search more 
deeply through memory to find information that supports their desired directional 
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conclusion of a positive evaluation. While several theories have posited a role for biased 
memory searches in motivated social evaluation, there are several limitations of extant 
research that have made it difficult to draw conclusions about its role (and, in some cases, 
even the role of desired directional conclusions). 
Barriers to understanding the role of biased memory searches and 
desired directional conclusions in social evaluation 
Why has it been challenging to understand the role of a biased search through 
memory in motivated social evaluations? First, previous research has operationalized 
memory in ways that do not shed light on underlying memory processes. Second, there 
are reasons to call into question whether some of the memory effects in the literature 
actually reflected motivated evaluations, that is, a desire to reach a directional conclusion. 
Finally, previous research has focused on evaluations in which people are aiming to make 
flattering evaluations rather than any motivated evaluation (e.g., unflattering, self-
verifying, etc.), so it is unclear if biased memory searches operate similarly when 
reaching any desired directional conclusion as when aiming to reach flattering ones. The 
following sections outline in more detail these limitations of past research. 
WHAT ROLE DOES BIASED MEMORY SEARCHING PLAY IN ASYMMETRIES IN MEMORY 
FOR POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SELF-RELEVANT INFORMATION? 
It is unclear what role biased searching through memory may play in motivated 
social evaluation because previous research has not actually measured biased searches 
through memory. Typically, memory has been operationalized as self-reported recall or 
recognition (Sedikides & Green, 2009). Researchers have rarely employed memory 
indices that allow for understanding the underlying role of biased memory searching. 
When researchers have used memory indices that operationalize underlying mechanisms 
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they were either custom ones or superficially reported but not discussed or interpreted. 
The use of custom indices makes it difficult to interpret the findings in any 
psychologically meaningful way due to the lack of theoretical backing. For example, one 
custom index that has been used is the ratio between positive and negative stimuli that are 
recognized (i.e., the ‘Positive Ratio’; Djikic, Chan, & Peterson, 2007; Djikic, Peterson, & 
Zelazo, 2005). The use of custom indices such as the ‘Positive Ratio’ has the same 
limitation as using raw recognition rates. A greater ‘Positive Ratio’ could be occurring 
due to stimulus properties of positive and negative words rather than motivation to reach 
a directional conclusion. Failing to use standardized memory indices has made it difficult 
to understand underlying processes such as the role of biased searching through 
memories in motivated social evaluation. 
ARE DIFFERENCES IN MEMORY FOR POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SELF-RELEVANT 
INFORMATION DUE TO DIRECTIONAL CONCLUSIONS? 
Research has typically conflated asymmetries in self-relevant memory with the 
desire to reach a specific directional conclusion (e.g., self-enhancement accounts).  Past 
research on valence asymmetries in self-relevant memory has not considered that there 
may be other processes that can lead to the difference between positive and negative 
memory besides a motivation toward positive self-evaluations. It may be the case that 
there are nonmotivated explanations for phenomena that are typically assumed to be 
motivated (e.g., Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). As one example of how nonmotivated 
processes may lead to the same effects as motivated processes, research has shown that 
people find it easier to process positive compared to negative stimuli and therefore 
positive stimuli are easier to remember or feel more familiar (e.g., fluency accounts; 
Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2017). In fact, words that have greater perceptual fluency are 
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more frequently judged as old in a recognition task (Johnston, Hawley, & Elliott, 1991). 
So, positive words might be remembered at greater rates simply due to more fluent 
processing of positive compared to negative words. If nonmotivated processes, such as 
valence differences in fluency, could account for self-relevant memory differences then it 
would suggest that this robust effect of self-relevant memory asymmetries may not 
actually be an instance of motivated social evaluation (i.e., must entail a desired 
directional conclusion). Past research conflating asymmetries in reported memory with 
motivation to reach a particular conclusion has made it unclear if we have really looked 
at instances of motivated social evaluation or if these are instances of nonmotivated 
processes (e.g., inherent properties of the stimuli). 
DOES BIASED SEARCHING THROUGH BELIEFS OPERATE SIMILARLY WHEN ONE HAS A 
DESIRE TO SEE A SOCIAL TARGET IN ANY DESIRED LIGHT (E.G., UNFLATTERING) AND IN 
A FLATTERING LIGHT? 
Past research examining biased memory searching has focused on the motivation 
to see a social target in a flattering light. For example, experiments involving motivation 
and memory typically look at how people remember more positive than negative 
information about the self (Sedikides & Green, 2009) or what qualities about the self 
people recall after experimentally manipulating which trait is desirable (Sanitioso, 
Kunda, & Fong, 1990). So, past research has shown that people exhibit differences in 
reported memory, but only in situations where people are likely aiming to make flattering 
social evaluations. To more deeply understand the role of biased memory searches in 
motivated social evaluation it is important to expand measures of biased searching 
through memories to cases where people are not just aiming to paint someone in a 
flattering light. Can the same mechanism of biased memory searching operate similarly 
for both flattering and unflattering desired directional conclusions? 
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Study Overview and Hypotheses 
Identifying limitations of past research reveals questions and avenues for a deeper 
understanding of the role of biased searching through memories in social evaluation. The 
proposed research addresses limitations in two overarching aims: (RQ1) to understand 
the role of a) biased memory searches and b) desired directional conclusions in 
asymmetric reported memory for self-relevant information (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3); 
and (RQ2) to understand if similar biased searches through memory may operate when 
people are motivated to paint someone in a particular light (given any directional 
conclusion) or are specific to instances where the goal is to paint someone in a flattering 
light (Studies 4). The current research aims to answer these questions by employing 
experimental, neurophysiological, and computational modeling methods.  
Studies 1a & 1b. Can incentives offered after encoding reduce asymmetries 
in standards for claiming recognition (i.e., biased memory searching) across 
valence? These studies utilized an incentive paradigm to understand if valence 
asymmetries in memory are due to a strong drive toward a positive conclusion that is 
relatively resistant to competing incentives (as might be predicted from a self-
enhancement perspective), or, alternatively, if valence asymmetries in memory are 
relatively responsive to alternate incentives (as could be predicted based on the logic of 
nonmotivated accounts such as the fluency account). If there is a strong underlying 
motivation, such as self-enhancement, then psychological or financial incentives would 
likely be unable to shift such a motivation. However, if there is no underlying motivation, 
then there is nothing to prevent incentives from reducing valence asymmetries in 
standards for claiming recognition. In study 1a participants received feedback ostensibly 
based on a personality questionnaire they completed (paradigm based on Djikic et al., 
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2005). Participants were offered psychological and financial incentives to recognize 
negative feedback they previously might claim to forget half way through a surprise 
recognition task. Differential standards for recognition between positive and negative 
were used to test for the role of biased memory searches (i.e., location (c) of Signal 
Detection Theory; Paulhus, Bruce, Harms, & Lysy, 2003). Further, if there is an effect of 
incentives on standards of recognition, then this would be more consistent with 
predictions based on nonmotivated accounts than the self-enhancement account 
suggesting valence asymmetries in memory for self-relevant information may not 
actually be motivated. However, if there is no effect of incentives on thresholds, then that 
would be more consistent with a self-enhancement account. Study 1b was a direct 
replication of Study 1a. 
Study 2a & 2b. Can incentives offered before encoding reduce asymmetries 
in biased searches through memory (as measured by standards for claiming 
recognition) across valence? Study 2a is a replication and extension of Studies 1a and 
1b. Study 1 found no effect of incentives on thresholds, which may reflect support for the 
self-enhancement account. Although Study 1 found support for the self-enhancement 
perspective, it is possible that memory asymmetries for self-relevant information begin at 
the time of encoding. As a more stringent test of how self-enhancement motivations may 
affect valence asymmetries in self-relevant memory, Study 2 aimed to test the role of 
self-enhancement motivations at the time of encoding. Differential standards for 
recognition between positive and negative were used to test for the role of biased memory 
searches. Further, if the self-enhancement account is again supported, then only higher 
levels of incentives (e.g., financially incentivized to recognize feedback about an other) 
could affect the asymmetries between positive and negative feedback because self-
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enhancement motivations are so strong that high levels of incentives would be needed. 
Study 2b was a direct replication of Study 2a. 
Study 3. Is the conservative threshold for negative feedback at retrieval 
associated with concealed knowledge? Study 3 utilized Event Related Potentials (ERP) 
to determine if self-reports of lower recognition of negative feedback are consistent with 
neural signatures of concealed knowledge. Results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that 
incentives only had an impact when offered before encoding and only in the most highly 
incentivized condition. Is it possible that part of the selective searching of negative 
feedback is suppression of memories for negative feedback at the time of retrieval? To 
understand how the negative feedback is uniquely processed, participants again saw 
bogus feedback (i.e., encoding phase) and then completed a surprise recognition task (i.e., 
retrieval phase). ERP data were collected during both the encoding and retrieval phases in 
order to assess if the ‘forgotten’ negative feedback was encoded and suppressed or not 
encoded in the first place. If there are differences between ‘forgotten’ negative, self-
relevant feedback and correctly identified new information during the recognition task, 
then that would suggest suppression of negative feedback at the time of retrieval. This 
may suggest one possible mechanism for valence differences in standards for claiming 
recognition.  Alternatively, if there are neurophysiological differences between forgotten 
and remembered negative, self-relevant feedback at encoding and retrieval, then that 
would suggest that there are multiple ways in which biased memory processes support 
self-enhancement motivations. 
Study 4. Does a similar biased search through memory operate when aiming 
to paint someone in an unflattering light as well as a flattering light? The first three 
studies aimed to understand the role of biased memory searches in motivated social 
evaluation given a flattering desired directional conclusion. Building on those findings, 
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Study 4 aimed to understand if biased searches through memory operate similarly given 
an unflattering directional conclusion. It is difficult to generalize about psychological 
processes when studying participants who have negative directional conclusions about 
the self (e.g., those prone to depression), therefore, Study 4 utilizes a paradigm in which 
the same person is likely to rate other social targets in a flattering and an unflattering 
light. Specifically, Democratic participants rate Republican and Democratic politicians 
on positive and negative traits. This 2x2 design allows for focusing on situations in which 
people want to make unflattering as well as flattering attributions as participants have the 
opportunity to rate disliked social targets negatively. There is abundant evidence that 
people more favorably rate in-group members over out-group members (Bartels, 2002; 
Brandt et al., 2014; Duarte et al., 2015; Munro et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 2004) and 
specifically this differential rating occurs in the political domain (Pew Research Center, 
2016). Drift-diffusion modeling (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978) was utilized to understand if 
belief searching functions similarly when the directional conclusion is unflattering as 
when it is flattering. If biased searching through memory functions the same given 
unflattering directional conclusions then there should be differential rates of evidence 
accumulation (i.e., drift rates from DDM) between positive and negative within each 
political affiliation (i.e., when given opportunities to affirm positive vs. negative traits of 
Democratic politicians and negative vs. positive traits of Republican politicians). 
Alternatively, if biased memory searching is more associated with a desire to make 
flattering evaluations then there should be differential rates of evidence accumulation 
when only when rating in-group politicians (i.e., only when given opportunities to affirm 
positive vs. negative traits of Democratic politicians). 
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STUDY 1A & 1B: CAN INCENTIVES OFFERED AFTER 
ENCODING REDUCE ASYMMETRIES IN STANDARDS FOR 
CLAIMING RECOGNITION (I.E., BIASED MEMORY 
SEARCHING) ACROSS VALENCE? 
Study 1 tested whether biased searching through memories supports valence 
asymmetries in memory for self-relevant information. Extant research has conflated 
valence asymmetries in memory with motivation to reach a desired directional 
conclusion. To address this limitation of extant research, Study 1 further examined if 
valence asymmetries in memory are the result of motivation to reach a desired directional 
conclusion by testing whether incentives other than self-flattery affect biased memory 
searches when presented after encoding. Participants were presented with bogus feedback 
about their personality traits and then given a surprise recognition test. Half way through 
the surprise recognition test, participants in some conditions were offered incentives (i.e., 
either psychological incentives only or a combination of psychological and financial 
incentives) for accurate recognition of both positive and negative feedback. Location (c) 
from Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is used to operationalize the underlying memory 
mechanism of biased memory searching (Green & Swets, 1966). If location (c) 
distinguishes positive from negative, then this suggests that biased searching through 
memories may contribute to this form of motivated social evaluation because it represents 
differential standards for claiming recognition depending on valence. Further, introducing 
incentives allows for testing if desired directional goals account for the asymmetries in 
memory. If incentives result in decreased asymmetries in reported memory (i.e., reported 
memory for positive and negative become more similar), then this would be consistent 
with non-motivated accounts (e.g., fluency).  However, if the asymmetries in reported 
memory are resistant to competing incentives, then this suggests a self-enhancement 
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account. Incentives failing to shift asymmetric memory supports the self-enhancement 
account because self-enhancement is thought to be a strong, automatic motivation akin to 
motivations such as hunger drives. If this motivation is strong and automatic, then 
incentives should not be sufficient to diminish the self-enhancement drive and the 
asymmetry in memory for positive and negative self-relevant information should persist. 
Alternatively, incentives shifting asymmetric memory suggests that there is no 
underlying competing motivation (i.e., self-enhancement) that is resilient to a new, 
competing motivation such as financial gain. 
Study 1 Method 
PARTICIPANTS 
Analysis of Study 1a focused on 187 participants (127 females, Mage = 19.07 
years, SD = 1.16)1. Eight additional participants were excluded due to subject error 
(seven responded on less than 80% of recognition test trials and one expressed confusion 
about the task). Analysis of Study 1b focused on 180 participants (125 females, Mage = 
19.10 years, SD = 1.28). Thirteen additional participants were excluded due to subject 
error (responded on less than 80% of recognition test trials). Trials that fell below two 
standard deviations below the mean reaction time for each experimental condition were 
excluded. These exclusion criteria were determined in advance for all studies to ensure 
analyses were based on meaningful trials and participants who were engaged in the task. 
Participants received course credit for their participation. All participants gave informed 
                                                 
1 Sample size was determined using G*Power and based on a power level of 0.90. Effect size was 
determined using a small effect size (ƞ2 = 0.15) of interactions within subjects. Studies of affirmation and 
financial incentives yield large effects, so the main effect of valence should be qualified by part if the 
retrieval bias were true (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). The 
recommended total sample size is 144. 
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consent in compliance with the human subject regulations of the University of Texas at 
Austin. 
PROCEDURE 
Study 1 modified a bogus personality feedback procedure used in previous 
research investigating memory for self-relevant feedback (Djikic, Peterson, & Zelazo, 
2005). Participants completed a personality assessment task, received bogus feedback 
about their personality, and then completed a surprise recognition test for the feedback 
(see Figure 3). In order to manipulate the extent to which memory for negative feedback 
was rewarding or non-threatening, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions for the second part of the surprise recognition test. The task was presented 
using E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, INC., Sharpsburg, PA). 
Personality ‘Assessment’ 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants completed a set of personality 
assessments:  the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988), the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the Big Five Inventory (John, 
Naumann, & Soto, 2008). In addition, participants completed two subjective tasks to 
increase the believability of subsequent feedback. First, participants were asked to pick 
one of four emotion words that best described a still picture (i.e., a modified form of the 
thematic apperception task). Second, participants completed a word association task in 
which they were asked to classify a given word as negative, neutral, or positive (e.g., 
nature). 
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Bogus Personality Feedback 
Participants then received feedback ostensibly calculated from their responses in 
the personality assessment. However, the feedback was not calculated from their 
responses and the content was the same for all participants. Specifically, all participants 
were presented with 80 positive and 80 negative traits (Anderson, 1968). In order to 
ensure that any recognition differences were not due to differences in familiarity, positive 
and negative traits were matched for meaningfulness (i.e., how well participants felt they 
understood the meaning of the word: Positive: M = 3.56 SD = 0.18; Negative: M = 3.56, 
SD = 0.20;  t(159) = -0.34, p = 0.73, d = 0.027). Participants first saw a screen which said 
‘You are’ (1000 ms). The 'You are' stem was then randomly completed with one of the 
160 traits (2000 ms). To ensure that participants were attending to the feedback, they 
were asked to press a key when the trait appeared on screen. Trials were separated by 
screens with a fixation cross (1000 ms). 
Surprise Recognition Test of Feedback 
Finally, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions where 
they completed a surprise recognition test of the feedback they received.  The surprise 
recognition test included all 320 trait words: the 160 traits presented in the experiments 
and 160 lures (80 positive, 80 negative). Trait words were presented (1000 ms) and trials 
were separated by a screen with a fixation cross (1500 ms). Participants used the 
keyboard to indicate whether they had previously seen the trait in their feedback or if it 
was a completely new word. Their responses were collected during the trait word 
presentation and the following fixation screen (2500 ms total to respond for each trait).  
For all three recognition conditions, participants performed the first half of the 
surprise recognition test (40 positive old, 40 positive new, 40 negative old, and 40 
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negative new). The random assignment affected the instructions that participants received 
after completing the first half of the recognition test. After the first half of the test was 
complete, participants were interrupted by the experimenter and told one of three things. 
In the Non Self-Relevant Feedback condition, participants were told that the feedback 
they received was actually meant for someone else and given to them by mistake. They 
were told that despite the error, their memory performance was still important and they 
should finish the task. This manipulation ensured that the negative feedback actually had 
no bearing on the self and, therefore, was not threatening to retrieve during the 
recognition task. In the Financial Incentive condition: participants were also told that the 
feedback was actually meant for someone else and further instructed that they would 
receive a cash bonus for correct identification of feedback as being old or new. 
Specifically, participants were instructed that they would receive a bonus of up to $10 
based on two randomly selected trials from the remaining recognition test. This 
manipulation added a financial incentive to retrieve memories of negative feedback.  In 
the Control condition, participants were told that the interruption was to provide a break 
so they wouldn’t feel fatigued for the last portion of the experiment. 
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Figure 1: Study design. Participants first completed a series of personality questions. 
They then received bogus personality feedback which was 50% positive and 
50% negative. Finally, participants completed a surprise recognition test for 
the feedback. In Study 1, participants completed the recognition task in two 
parts to manipulate the extent to which recognizing negative feedback was 
rewarding or non-threatening. No EEG data was collected. In Study 2, the 
motivational manipulation occurred prior to encoding and participants 
completed the recognition task uninterrupted, as depicted. In Study 3, 
participants completed the recognition task uninterrupted and EEG data was 
acquired while they received feedback and while they completed the 
surprise recognition task. 
Behavioral Analysis 
Memory for feedback was analyzed in two ways: Proportion recognized and 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT). Proportion recognized was calculated by dividing 
remembered words by the number of words that could have been recognized within a 
given condition (Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; Pinter, Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 
2011). Proportion recognized gives a raw rate of memory. SDT was used to calculate 
thresholds for recognition of feedback (i.e., criterion location (c): Paulhus, Bruce, Harms, 
& Lysy, 2003) and accuracy (i.e., d’: Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008). Standardized 
memory indices such as Signal Detection Theory allows for operationalizing underlying 
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memory mechanisms rather than making assumptions about the role of memory in 
motivated social evaluation. From the perspective of SDT, criterion location (c) indicates 
the strength of an internal feeling of familiarity that a participant needs to claim 
recognition. Criterion location (c) is calculated by considering hits and false alarms: 
C = (Hits + False Alarms)/2 
Higher numbers reflect a more liberal threshold which indicates that lower levels 
of internal familiarity are needed before claiming recognition. Location (c) yields a 
measure of how much participants were willing to claim recognition based on very little 
feeling of familiarity. Further, d’ indicates the ability to discriminate old stimuli from 
new stimuli. It is also calculated by considering hits and false alarms: 
D’ = Hits – False Alarms 
Higher numbers reflect greater accuracy, which indicates a greater ability to 
distinguish old from new stimuli. Data were then analyzed using a 3-way ANOVA with 
two within-subject factors (Valence: Positive and Negative; Time: Part 1 and Part 2) and 
one between-subjects factor (Manipulation Condition: Non Self-Relevant Feedback, Non 
Self-Relevant Feedback + Financial Incentive, and Control) for each of these three 
memory measures. All three measures are reported and discussed, but special emphasis is 
placed on location (c) as it relates to the central research questions about the role of 
biased searching through memories in motivated social evaluation. 
Pooling Data 
Study 1 included two samples (1a and 1b) which were analyzed according to the 
recommendations of Integrative Data Analysis, which advocates for the pooling of data 
sets to optimize statistical power and assess replication when the original data are 
available (rather than meta-analyses when only effect sizes are available: Curran & 
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Hussong, 2009). As the two samples were identical in procedure and small effect sizes 
were expected, IDA offers several benefits. Study was included as a factor to ensure that 
there were no significant differences between the two samples and whether the results 
replicated in each independent sample is discussed. 
STUDY 1 RESULTS 
More liberal thresholds for claiming recognition of positive as compared to 
negative trait feedback across incentive conditions and part of recognition task. 
Location (c) indicated different standards for claiming recognition of negative, self-
relevant feedback. Participants had a more liberal threshold for remembering positive 
feedback compared to negative feedback (Main effect of Valence, F(1,361) = 101.74, p < 
0.001, ηp2 = 0.22) which persisted even after financial incentives were presented and/or 
threat was removed (interaction between Valence, Time, and Recognition condition, 
F(2,361) = 0.214, p = 0.807, ηp2 = 0.001; see Figure 2). There was a main effect of Time 
(F(1,361) = 190.05, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.345), but there was no main effect of Recognition 
condition (F(1,361) = 1.22, p = 0.298, ηp2 = 0.007). These results were not affected by 
data sample (interaction between Valence, Time, Recognition condition, and Study, 
F(2,361) = 1.571, p = 0.209, ηp2 = 0.009). The persistence of more conservative standards 
for claiming recognition of negative feedback in the face of financial incentive plus threat 
to self-esteem is eliminated or when only threat to self-esteem is eliminated is consistent 
with the self-enhancement hypothesis.  
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Figure 2: Study 1 Results: location c. Participants used more liberal thresholds to 
claim recognition of positive feedback as compared to negative feedback 
regardless of condition (Non-Self Relevant, Financial Incentive, or Control). 
Providing psychological or financial incentives for memory did not result in 
a significant shift of threshold for claiming negative feedback. 
This pattern of results replicated within each individual sample. Participants in 
Study 1a had a more liberal thresholds for remembering positive feedback compared to 
negative feedback (Main effect of Valence, F(1,184) = 41.33, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.183) 
which persisted even after financial incentives were presented and/or threat was removed 
(interaction between Valence, Time, and Recognition condition, F(2,184) = 0.77, p = 
0.462, ηp2 = 0.008). Participants in Study 1b had a more liberal threshold for 
remembering positive feedback compared to negative feedback (Main effect of Valence, 
F(1,177) = 64.40, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.267) which persisted even after financial incentives 
were presented and/or threat was removed (interaction between Valence, Time, and 
Recognition condition, F(2,177) = 0.985, p = 0.376, ηp2 = 0.01). 
Greater accuracy for negative as compared to positive trait feedback across 
incentive conditions and part of recognition task. D’ indicated greater accuracy for 
negative trait words than for positive trait words (Main effect of Valence, F(1,361) = 
135.92, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.274) which persisted even after financial incentives were 
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presented and/or threat was removed (interaction between Valence, Time, and 
Recognition condition, F(2,361) = 0.11, p = 0.895, ηp2 = 0.001; see Figure 3). There was 
a main effect of Time (F(1,361) = 99.12, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.215), but there was no main 
effect of Recognition condition (F(1,361) = 0.73, p = 0.483, ηp2 = 0.004). These results 
were not affected by data sample (interaction between Valence, Time, Recognition 
condition, and Study, F(2,361) = 1.79, p = 0.168, ηp2 = 0.01).  
 
 
Figure 3: Study 1 Results: d prime. Participants had higher accuracy for negative as 
compared to positive traits across incentive condition and parts of the 
recognition task.  
This pattern of results was replicated within each individual sample. Participants 
in Study 1a had greater accuracy for negative feedback compared to positive feedback 
(Main effect of Valence, F(1,184) = 42.60, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.188) which persisted even 
after financial incentives were presented and/or threat was removed (interaction between 
Valence, Time, and Recognition condition, F(2,184) = 0.50, p = 0.605, ηp2 = 0.005). 
Participants in Study 1b had greater accuracy for negative feedback compared to positive 
feedback (Main effect of Valence, F(1,177) = 102.33, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.366) which 
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persisted even after financial incentives were presented and/or threat was removed 
(interaction between Valence, Time, and Recognition condition, F(2,177) = 1.41, p = 
0.248, ηp2 = 0.016). 
Greater recognition of positive as compared to negative trait feedback. An 
analysis of how many words were remembered found similar results to the analyses with 
location (c). Participants remembered more positive compared to negative traits from 
their personality feedback (Main effect of Valence, F(1,361) = 23.48, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.061; see Figure 4) which persisted even after financial incentives were presented and/or 
threat was removed (interaction between Valence, Time, and Recognition condition, 
F(2,361) = 0.035, p = 0.965, ηp2 = 0). There was a main effect of Time (F(1,361) = 
256.07, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.415), but there was no main effect of Recognition condition 
(F(1,361) = 1.01, p = 0.364, ηp2 = 0.006). These results were not significantly affected by 
data sample (interaction between Valence, Time, Recognition condition, and Study, 
F(2,361) = 2.24, p = 0.108, ηp2 = 0.012).  
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Figure 4: Study 1 Results: Recognition Rates. Participants recognized more positive 
traits than negative traits across incentive conditions and across parts of the 
recognition task. † = 0.07 
This pattern of results replicated within each individual sample. Participants in 
Study 1a remembered more positive compared to negative traits (Main effect of Valence, 
F(1,184) = 11.76, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.060) which persisted even after financial incentives 
were presented and/or threat was removed (interaction between Valence, Time, and 
Recognition condition, F(2,184) = 1.05, p = 0.351, ηp2 = 0.011). Participants in Study 1b 
remembered more positive compared to negative traits (Main effect of Valence, F(1,177) 
= 12.10, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.064) which persisted even after financial incentives were 
presented and/or threat was removed (interaction between Valence, Time, and 
Recognition condition, F(2,177) = 1.22, p = 0.298, ηp2 = 0.014). 
Equivalence testing of valence effects. Equivalence testing (i.e., two one-sided 
tests: Lakens, 2017) was conducted to contextualize the valence effects found in the main 
analysis (i.e., location (c)). Upper and lower bounds were selected (raw difference of .06 
to -.06, see Lakens, 2017) to test whether observed valence effects might be considered 
equivalent to an effect size that is too small to consider as a meaningful difference 
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between conditions (i.e., fell significantly within upper and lower bounds) or an effect 
that may be of interest (i.e., fell outside upper and lower bounds, that is, not significantly 
within the equivalence bounds). In the main analyses, significant differences were found 
between positive and negative valence in all conditions. Therefore, we expected that the 
equivalence testing would find that the observed effects did not significantly fall within a 
range of differences that were equal to or close to zero. As expected, for all conditions, 
the observed valence effect sizes were outside of the equivalence bounds: Control 
Condition: t(120) = -0.3, p = .62 (Part 1), -0.2, p = .58 (Part 2); Non Self-Relevant: t(126) 
= -1.04, p = .84 (Part 1), -.76, p =.77 (Part 2); Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward: 
t(118) = -0.13, p = .55 (Part 1), -0.44, p = .66 (Part 2). Therefore, the equivalence test 
results do not support the concern that some of the conditions yielded valence effects that 
happen to be statistically significant from a null hypothesis testing approach yet are small 
enough to overlap with non-meaningful differences. 
STUDY 1 DISCUSSION 
Study 1 findings are more consistent with a self-enhancement account in that 
asymmetries in memory are not easily responsive to alternate incentives. Further, the 
main effect of valence on location (c) suggests that people have different standards for 
claiming recognition of positive compared to negative feedback (i.e., one form of biased 
searching through memories). Study 1 findings suggest that asymmetries in proportion 
from previous research may have arisen from more liberal thresholds and lower accuracy 
for positive compared to negative information. The incentives provided after encoding 
took place failed to shift this memory distortion, which lends support to a self-
enhancement account. It seems that reported memory asymmetries are likely arising from 
a motivational drive to claim recognition of positive feedback rather than inherent 
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differences in positive and negative stimuli as suggested by the logic of nonmotivated 
accounts such as the fluency account. However, the feedback was offered after encoding 
took place. It could be that disruptions in memory occur at the time of encoding making 
any incentives unable to shift memory and thresholds for negative feedback. Would 
incentives influence differences in location (c) for positive and negative if presented 
before encoding? 
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STUDY 2A & 2B: CAN INCENTIVES OFFERED BEFORE ENCODING 
REDUCE ASYMMETRIES IN STANDARDS FOR CLAIMING RECOGNITION 
(I.E., BIASED MEMORY SEARCHING) ACROSS VALENCE? 
While the results of Study 1 provide support for the self-enhancement account and 
the role of biased memory searching, it is unclear if disruptions at the time of encoding 
could lead to differences in recognition thresholds at the time of retrieval. Study 2 builds 
on Study 1 by introducing incentives prior to encoding rather than after. Participants were 
presented with bogus feedback about their personality traits or a peer’s personality traits 
and then given a known or a surprise recognition test. Importantly, participants in the 
incentive conditions were given information about incentives (again, either psychological 
or psychological and financial) prior to receiving any feedback (i.e., prior to the encoding 
phase). This creates four distinct incentive condition levels. The first condition is similar 
to the control condition in Study 1 as the feedback is about the self and there is no 
financial reward. From there participants received increasing levels of incentives. The 
second condition offered financial incentives, but the feedback was about the self. The 
third condition offered no financial incentives, but the feedback was about an other which 
makes it less threatening to the self. Finally, the fourth condition offered financial 
incentives and the feedback was about an other. If biased memory searching does play a 
role in motivated social evaluation then location (c) should again distinguish positive 
from negative. Further, if self-enhancement accounts rather than fluency accounts are 
supported then incentives should again have no effect on self-relevant feedback, but may 
impact memory indices in the highest incentive condition (i.e., non self-relevant and 
financially rewarded). 
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Study 2 Method 
PARTICIPANTS 
Analysis of Study 2a focused on 254 participants (183 females, Mage = 18.70 
years, SD = 1.39). 21 additional participants were excluded due to subject error (9 
responded on fewer than 80% of recognition test trials, 10 asked not to use data, 2 
answered manipulation check questions incorrectly). Analysis of Study 2b focused on 
332 participants (233 females, Mage = 19.31 years, SD = 2.87). 32 additional participants 
were excluded due to subject error (11 responded on fewer than 80% of recognition test 
trials, 7 asked not to use data, 14 answered manipulation check questions incorrectly). 
Trials were excluded which fell below two standard deviations below the mean reaction 
time for each experimental condition. These exclusion criteria were determined in 
advance for all studies to ensure analyses were based on participants who were engaged 
in the task. Participants received course credit for their participation. All participants gave 
informed consent in compliance with the human subject regulations of the University of 
Texas at Austin. 
PROCEDURE 
The procedure for Study 2 was almost identical to the procedure for Studies 1a 
and 1b. The only exceptions being (1) that half of the participants were informed of the 
memory test and offered financial incentives for their memory performance prior to 
receiving personality feedback (2) half of each incentive group saw feedback about a peer 
instead of the self and (3) there was no break during the recognition task.  Participants 
were given one of four different instructions. In the Self, Surprise Memory Test condition 
participants completed the personality assessment about themselves and were not offered 
bonus money nor warned of the subsequent memory test. This manipulation served as the 
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control condition and is similar to the control condition in the previous studies. In the 
Self, Warned and Incentivized condition, participants completed the personality 
assessment about themselves, but were additionally offered bonus money and warned of 
the subsequent memory test. Specifically, participants were instructed that they would 
receive a bonus of up to $10 based on two randomly selected trials from an upcoming 
recognition test. This manipulation added a financial incentive to encode memories of 
negative feedback.  In the Other, Surprise Memory Test condition, participants completed 
the personality assessment about another student (displayed picture was gender matched) 
and were not offered bonus money nor warned of the subsequent memory test. This 
manipulation served to motivationally incentivize the encoding of negative feedback as it 
was not self-relevant. In the Other, Warned and Incentivized condition, participants 
completed the personality assessment about a peer, but were additionally offered bonus 
money and warned of the subsequent memory test. Specifically, participants were 
instructed that they would receive a bonus of up to $10 based on two randomly selected 
trials from an upcoming recognition test. This manipulation added a financial and 
motivational incentive to encode memories of negative feedback. 
Behavioral Analysis 
As in Studies 1a and 1b, Study 2 examined location (c) and d’ from Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT) as well as raw recognition rates. Further, as in Study 1, data 
were collapsed across Studies 2a and 2b to maximize the power to detect small effects 
and provide the most accurate estimate of effect sizes (Curran & Hussong, 2009). 
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Study 2 Results 
More liberal thresholds for claiming recognition of positive as compared to 
negative trait feedback except given the greatest level of incentives. Location (c) 
indicated more conservative thresholds for negative, self-relevant feedback in all 
conditions except the Other, Warned and Incentivized condition. Participants had a more 
liberal threshold for remembering positive feedback compared to negative feedback 
(Main effect of Valence, F(1,578) = 43.07, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.069; see Figure 5). 
However, participants did not have a more liberal threshold for remembering positive 
feedback in all four conditions (interaction between Valence and Incentive condition, 
F(3,578) = 2.99, p = 0.031, ηp2 = 0.015; see Figure 5). There was also a main effect of 
Incentive condition (F(1,578) = 3.09, p = 0.027, ηp2 = 0.016). These results were not 
affected by data sample (interaction between Valence, Incentive condition, and Study, 
F(3,578) = 0.686, p = 0.561, ηp2 = 0.004). The acceptance of negative feedback only 
when that feedback is no longer self-threatening and financially incentivized is consistent 
with the self-enhancement hypothesis. Further, the more liberal thresholds for positive as 
compared to negative further supports the role of biased memory searching in valence 
asymmetries for self-relevant feedback.  
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Figure 5: Study 2 Results: location c. Participants used more liberal thresholds to 
claim recognition of positive feedback as compared to negative feedback 
except when they had the most incentives (Other, Warned and Incentivized 
condition). 
 Post hoc t-tests between the Non Self-Relevant conditions revealed that 
the highest level of reward was related to a shift in location (c) within the negative 
condition, but not within the positive condition. There was no significant difference 
between Non Self-Relevant positive and Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward positive 
(t(307) = -0.37, p = 0.711, d = 0.044), but there was a marginally significant difference 
between Non Self-Relevant negative and Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward negative 
(t(307) = 1.83, p = 0.068, d = 0.209). The difference between the two negative 
conditions, but not the two positive conditions suggests that the effect of the increasing 
financial reward is associated with a shift in negative rather than positive.  
This pattern of results replicated within each individual sample.  Participants in 
Study 2a had a more liberal threshold for remembering positive feedback compared to 
negative feedback (Main effect of Valence, F(1,250) = 16.29, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.061) 
except this difference showed a trend to be less pronounced in the Non Self-Relevant + 
Financial Reward condition (interaction between Valence and Incentive condition, 
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F(3,250) = 1.921, p = 0.127, ηp2 = 0.023). Pairwise t-tests found that participants in the 
other three conditions showed significant differences in location (c) for positive and 
negative feedback (Self-Relevant: t(58) = 2.85, p = 0.006, d = 0.372; Self-Relevant + 
Financial Reward: t(54) = 2.68, p = 0.01, d = 0.379; Non Self-Relevant: t(76) = 2.22, p = 
0.029, d = 0.257; Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward: t(62) = 0.08, p = 0.935, d = 
0.014). As in Study 2a, pairwise t-tests conducted on Study 2b data found that 
participants showed significant differences in location (c) for all conditions except the 
Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward condition (Self-Relevant: t(85) = 2.49, p = 0.015, 
d = 0.271; Self-Relevant + Financial Reward: t(76) = 3.26, p = 0.002, d = 0.378; Non 
Self-Relevant: t(89) = 3.61, p = 0.001, d = 0.310; Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward: 
t(78) = 1.45, p = 0.15, d = 0.162). An ANOVA found that participants had a more liberal 
threshold for remembering positive feedback compared to negative feedback (Main effect 
of Valence, F(1,328) = 28.53, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.080; interaction between Valence and 
Incentive condition was not significant, F(3,328) = 1.38, p = 0.249, ηp2 = 0.012).  
Greater accuracy for negative as compared to positive trait feedback across 
incentive conditions. D’ indicated greater accuracy for negative trait words than for 
positive trait words (Main effect of Valence, F(1,578) = 249.70, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.301). 
This pattern was not significantly affected by increasing levels of financial and 
psychological incentives (interaction between Valence and Incentive condition, F(2,578) 
= 2.25, p = 0.082, ηp2 = 0.011; see Figure 6). There was also a main effect of Incentive 
condition (F(1,578) = 6.85, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.034). These results were not affected by 
data sample (interaction between Valence, Incentive condition, and Study, F(2,578) = 
0.48, p = 0.7, ηp2 = 0.002).  
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Figure 6: Study 2 Results: d prime. Participants had higher accuracy for negative as 
compared to positive traits across incentive condition and parts of the 
recognition task. 
This pattern of results replicated within each individual sample.  Participants in 
Study 2a had greater accuracy for negative trait words than for positive trait words (Main 
effect of Valence, F(1,250) = 138.60, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.358). The interaction between 
Valence and Incentive condition was not significant (F(3,250) = 0.95, p = 0.415, ηp2 = 
0.011).  Participants in Study 2b had greater accuracy for negative trait words than for 
positive trait words (Main effect of Valence, F(1,328) = 124.21, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.274). 
The interaction between Valence and Incentive condition was not significant (F(3,328) = 
1.88, p = 0.134, ηp2 = 0.017). 
No difference in recognition of positive and negative trait feedback. As in 
previous research, (Green et al., 2008), when proportion of words remembered was 
considered, participants did not remember significantly more positive as compared to 
negative traits from their personality feedback (Main effect of Valence, F(1,578) = 1.24, 
p = 0.258, ηp2 = 0.002; see Figure 7). This pattern was not significantly affected by 
increasing levels of incentives (interaction between Valence and Incentive condition, 
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F(2,578) = 0.71, p = 0.55, ηp2 = 0.004). However, there was a main effect of Incentive 
condition (F(1,578) = 2.61, p = 0.050, ηp2 = 0.013). This pattern was not significantly 
affected by increasing levels of financial and psychological incentives (interaction 
between Valence and Incentive condition, F(3,578) = 0.711, p = 0.546, ηp2 = 0.004).  
 
 
Figure 7: Study 2 Results: Recognition Rates. Participants did not recognize 
significantly more positive traits than negative traits across incentive 
conditions. 
This pattern of results replicated within each individual sample. Participants in 
Study 2a did not remember significantly more positive compared to negative traits (Main 
effect of Valence, F(1,250) = 0.69, p = 0.41, ηp2 = 0.003). The interaction between 
Valence and Incentive condition was not significant (F(3,250) = 1.68, p = 0.172, ηp2 = 
0.020).  Participants in Study 2b did not remember significantly more positive compared 
to negative traits (Main effect of Valence, F(1,328) = 0.37, p = 0.545, ηp2 = 0.001). The 
interaction between Valence and Incentive condition was not significant (F(3,328) = 
0.91, p = 0.435, ηp2 = 0.008). 
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Equivalence testing of valence effects. As in Study 1, equivalence testing 
(Lakens, 2017) with the same upper and lower bounds, was conducted to contextualize 
the valence effects found in the main analysis (i.e., location (c)). Consistent with the main 
analyses, observed valence effects fell outside of the equivalence bounds for the Self-
Relevant condition (t(144) = 0.75, p = .22), Self-Relevant + Financial Reward condition 
(t(131) = 1.37, p = .09), and Non Self-Relevant condition (t(166) = 1.15, p = .13) yet fell 
within the equivalence bounds for the Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward condition 
(t(141) = 5.2 p < .001). Therefore, the equivalence test results were consistent with the 
interpretation of the main analyses: the Non Self-Relevant + Financial Reward condition 
alone yielded an observed effect that was suggestive of a lack of difference in recognition 
thresholds for negative and positive feedback.  
Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 findings, like Study 1 findings, are consistent with a self-enhancement 
account and support the role of biased memory searching in motivated social evaluation. 
Asymmetries in memory searching are only responsive to the highest measured level of 
alternate incentives (i.e., non self-relevant and financially incentivized). This supports the 
self-enhancement account in that it shows how difficult it is to incentivize people to shift 
their thresholds for claiming negative feedback. Even when offered prior to encoding, 
threshold shifts did not occur except with the highest measured level of incentives. 
Further, as in Study 1, there is a significant main effect of valence when analyzing 
location (c) suggesting that motivated social evaluation is at least in part supported by 
biased searching through memories. Therefore, results from studies 1 & 2 suggest that 
people have more conservative thresholds for negative feedback and this is likely due to 
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self-enhancement motivations. Is the conservative threshold for negative feedback at 
retrieval associated with concealed knowledge? 
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STUDY 3: ARE THE MORE CONSERVATIVE THRESHOLDS 
ASSOCIATED WITH REMEMBERING NEGATIVE FEEDBACK 
ASSOCIATED WITH CONCEALED KNOWLEDGE OF THAT 
FEEDBACK? 
Study 3 builds on Studies 1 and 2 by examining the neural markers of self-
relevant feedback at encoding and retrieval as a function of valence and memory. More 
specifically, what best characterizes the forgotten, negative self-relevant feedback? One 
hypothesis is that ERPs associated with forgotten, negative self-relevant feedback suggest 
suppressed knowledge of that feedback. Previous research finds that ERPs show 
significant differences for information that has been encoded but suppressed at the time 
of retrieval (when compared to novel information: Hu et al., 2015). One alternative 
hypothesis is that self-reported memory reflects truly forgotten feedback: event-related 
potentials (ERPs) from ongoing EEG activity can significantly distinguish between 
negative self-relevant feedback that is forgotten versus remembered. Previous research 
suggests that ERPs associated with forgotten information should be distinguishable from 
remembered information at the time of encoding and retrieval (Paller, Kutas, & Mayes, 
1987; Neville et al., 1986). Therefore, Study 3 examines two possible neurophysiological 
patterns to characterize the processing of negative, self-relevant feedback: (1) a pattern of 
difference associated with suppression (i.e., a significant difference between forgotten 
negative, self-relevant feedback compared to correctly identified new information, that is, 
correct rejections during a recognition task) and (2) a pattern of difference associated 
with memory differences (i.e., a significant difference between remembered negative 
versus forgotten negative feedback at the time of encoding and retrieval).  We draw on a 
permutation approach for analyzing ERPs (Nichols & Holmes, 2002; Trujillo, Allen, 
Schnyer, & Peterson, 2010; Sanguinetti, Trujillo, Schnyer, Allen, & Peterson, 2016). A 
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permutation approach addresses the issues commonly associated with ERP analytic 
approaches that allow for experimenter flexibility in selecting time windows and 
electrode locations as well as inappropriate correction of multiple comparisons (see Luck 
& Gaspelin, 2017). 
Study 3 Method 
PARTICIPANTS 
Analysis focused on 36 participants (28 females, Mage = 19.53 years, SD = 2.40)2. 
Three additional participants were excluded due to subject error (responded on less than 
80% of either encoding or recognition trials). Participants were right-handed, native 
English speakers, and were screened for medications, neurological, or psychological 
conditions that might affect the neural responses or psychological effects being tested 
(i.e., clinical depression, head trauma, epilepsy, etc.). All participants gave informed 
consent in compliance with the human subject regulations of the University of Texas at 
Austin. 
PROCEDURE 
The behavioral procedure for Study 3 was similar to Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b 
with a few exceptions. First, there was no manipulation presented halfway through the 
recognition task or prior to feedback receipt. Second, participants were presented with 
bogus feedback that consisted of 85 positive traits and 85 negative traits. The increase in 
trait feedback ensured there would be sufficient power (i.e., trials per condition) to 
conduct the planned ERP analyses. As in Study 1, positive and negative traits were 
                                                 
2 Sample size was determined using G*Power and based on a power level of 0.90. Effect size was determined 
using a conservative effect size (d = 0.59) of the difference between memory for positive and negative feedback, 
which is consistent with effect sizes from previous research of this memory bias (d = 0.60 to 1.95; Zengel et al., 
2016; Green & Sedikides, 2004; Green et al., 2008). The recommended total sample size is 33.. 
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matched for meaningfulness (Positive: M = 3.55, SD = 0.18; Negative:  M = 3.56, SD = 
0.20; t(169) = -0.52, p = 0.60). 
Behavioral Analysis 
As in Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 examined the location (c) from Signal Detection 
Theory. 
ERP Acquisition and Processing 
Sixty-four channels of continuous EEG data were recorded using BrainVision 
PyCorder and processed with the Analyzer 2 software, (BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, 
NC). Four additional electrodes were placed in and outside of the cap to record horizontal 
and vertical eye movements. Impedances were kept below 5 k Ω. Caps were constructed 
and positioned on each participant to conform to the extended 10-20 International 
System. 
Offline, data were band-pass filtered (0.1 - 30 Hz respectively) and re-referenced 
to the linked mastoids (TP9 and TP10). Continuous EEGs were then epoched starting at 
200 ms before to 2000 ms after the onset of the stimulus. Ocular artifacts were removed 
by deriving bipolar eye channels and employing the Gratton & Coles method of ocular 
correction. Finally, trials were averaged into individual conditions (Encoding and 
Retrieval: negative later remembered (Mtrial count = 38), negative later forgotten (Mtrial count 
= 46); Retrieval: correctly identified as new negative feedback (Mtrial count = 60)) and all 
epochs were baselined to an average of the prestimulus period of -200 to 0ms.  
Epoched data were analyzed using non-parametric randomized permutation 
pairwise comparison approach and were cluster corrected for multiple comparisons 
across time and electrode site (p < 0.05, 20,000 permutations; Nichols & Holmes, 2002; 
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Trujillo, Allen, Schnyer, & Peterson, 2010; Sanguinetti, Trujillo, Schnyer, Allen, & 
Peterson, 2016). This method of analysis is advantageous because it utilizes all of the 
recorded data across the whole scalp, thereby avoiding subjective decisions about regions 
of interest and time windows as in past methods of ERP analysis (see Trujillo et al., 2010; 
Sanguinetti et al., 2016; Nichols & Holmes, 2002).). By applying cluster correction 
algorithms for multiple comparisons, it also avoids the problems of inflated alpha levels 
associated with traditional t-tests.  
To perform these tests, independent statistical significance thresholds for each 
data point were determined by estimating a t-distribution from the data for each electrode 
and time-point, computing t-statistics from each of 20,000 random between condition 
permutations of data across conditions under the null hypothesis. For each of these 
permutations, a random subset of conditions were swapped before t-values were 
computed. Under the null hypothesis, these t-values are elements of the null distribution. 
Thus, 20,000 t-values are created to form a data driven distribution, and a two-tailed 
p=.05 primary threshold was determined for each data point. These thresholds form a 
three-dimensional matrix where two dimensions preserve the topographic organization of 
the electrodes, and the third dimension is time.  
In a second step, these significance thresholds were used to determine contiguous 
locations where clusters of data exceeded the significance thresholds. A second round of 
20,000 permutations were computed. During each permutation, the p=.05 thresholds 
achieved in the first step were applied at each data point, thus determining which points 
exceed this threshold. Contiguous clusters were formed from points that have t-values 
above these thresholds; a maximal cluster size is determined for each permutation step, 
yielding a distribution of 20,000 maximal cluster values under the null hypothesis. Lastly, 
in a third step, this distribution of maximal cluster sizes is used to test t-statistic cluster 
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sizes from the true dataset. Clusters in the actual dataset with t-statistics greater than the 
maximal cluster distribution’s p=.05 criterion cluster size are considered significant at the 
two-tailed level, thus providing strong control for type-I errors. 
Study 3 Results 
Behavioral Results: Greater Recognition for Positive Self-Relevant Feedback 
Compared to Negative Self-Relevant Feedback. Consistent with the control conditions 
in Studies 1 and 2, participants had more liberal thresholds for claiming familiarity with 
positive feedback than negative feedback, t(35) = 4.58, p < 0.001, d = 0.84  (see Figure 
8).   
 
 
Figure 8: Study 3 Behavioral Results. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants had a more 
liberal threshold for claiming recognition of positive feedback as compared 
to negative feedback. Numbers indicate means and (standard deviations).  
Self-Reported Memory is Associated with Meaningful Distinctions For 
Negative Self-Relevant Feedback at Encoding and Retrieval. The ERP analysis 
 39 
suggested that self-reports of memory were associated with differences at the 
neurophysiological level of analysis. There were significantly different ERPs associated 
with forgotten negative feedback at the time of encoding and retrieval when compared to 
remembered negative feedback. During the encoding phase of the task, ERPs were 
generally smaller for negative feedback that would later be forgotten (in the surprise 
recognition task) than for feedback that would subsequently be remembered (i.e., a 
cluster spanning frontal to posterior sites between 700-800 ms after stimulus onset, see 
Figure 9A). During the retrieval phase of the task, ERPs associated with forgotten 
negative feedback were also smaller than responses for correctly remembered negative 
feedback (i.e., a cluster on the central scalp between 600-1000 ms after stimulus onset, 
see Figure 9B).  
ERPs Associated with Negative Self-Feedback that is Self-Reported as 
Forgotten are not Significantly Distinct from ERPs Associated with Correctly 
Identified Novel Feedback. Previous research suggests that ERPs measured during 
retrieval can distinguish between suppressed information and novel information (Hu et 
al., 2015) yet the cluster corrected threshold analyses did not identify any statistically 
significant ERP differences at the permutation threshold of .05 (two-tailed) for the 
forgotten negative feedback compared to feedback words that were correctly identified as 
novel. In other words, participants' neurophysiological response to negative feedback 
they claimed to not remember was not statistically distinguishable from the ERP response 
to information they were seeing for the first time. 
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Figure 9: Study 3 ERP Results. ERP results were significantly able to distinguish self-
reported memorydifferences at both encoding and retrieval. Bottom graphs 
indicate clusters where there are significant differences between the two 
conditions. Top graphs show representative waveforms of each condition at 
one electrode for visualization purposes (electrode site circled in blue on 
bottom graphs). 
Study 3 Discussion 
Study 3 results support the ‘forgotten memories’ hypothesis rather than the 
‘concealed knowledge’ hypothesis. More specifically, there was a significant difference 
between neural patterns associated with remembered negative versus forgotten negative 
feedback at the time of encoding and retrieval and there was no difference between 
forgotten negative, self-relevant feedback compared to correctly identified new 
information (i.e., correct rejections) during the recognition task. These results suggest 
that negative, self-relevant feedback that is ‘forgotten’ is not encoded in the first place. 
This lower rate of encoding negative self-relevant feedback occurs in conjunction with 
biased searching through memories as measured by differential standards for claiming 
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recognition of positive and negative feedback.  Further, results from Studies 1, 2, & 3 all 
support a self-enhancement account. It is challenging to find incentives that encourage 
deviations from the self-flattering standards of recognition typically applied to self-
relevant feedback (rather than differences arising from properties of the stimuli) and self-
enhancement motivations are further supported by disruptions at the time of encoding for 
negative, self-relevant feedback. 
  
 42 
STUDY 4: DOES BIASED SEARCHING THROUGH MEMORY OPERATE 
SIMILARLY WHEN AIMING TO PAINT SOMEONE IN AN UNFLATTERING 
LIGHT AS WELL AS IN A FLATTERING LIGHT? 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 addressed the limitations in the extant research that were 
related to operationalizing the underlying mechanisms of biased searches through 
memory and conflation of valence asymmetries in memory with motivation toward a 
specific conclusion. However, there is still the limitation of only focusing on biased 
memory searches when the desired directional conclusion is flattering. Study 4 builds on 
previous research and Studies 1-3 by testing whether biased memory searching operates 
in cases where flattering and unflattering conclusions are desired by the same person 
about different social targets. Participants rated liked and disliked politicians on positive 
and negative traits, which created opportunities to evaluate liked others in a flattering 
light and disliked others in an unflattering light. Drift Diffusion Modeling (DDM), which 
allows for independent calculation of two parameters (i.e., starting point and drift rate), 
was used to understand if biased memory searching supports painting people in 
unflattering lights as well as flattering lights. Unlike in Studies 1-3, in which location (c) 
of SDT was used, Study 4 used drift rate of DDM as a measure of biased memory 
searches. If biased memory searching operates similarly given flattering and unflattering 
directional conclusions, then we would expect drift rates to differ as a function of 
political affiliation and rating positive and negative traits. In other words, positive and 
negative trait ratings should be associated with different drift rates depending on whether 
the evaluation is about an in-group target or an out-group target (i.e., when desired 
directional conclusions are likely unflattering). However, if biased memory searching 
supports motivated social evaluation only when aiming to paint a social target in a 
flattering light, then we would expect drift rates to differ for positive and negative trait 
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ratings only within the in-group political party condition. Starting point is calculated, but 
only discussed to determine if this paradigm could actually be an instance of people 
exhibiting desired directional conclusions. 
Study 4 Method 
PARTICIPANTS 
Analysis was conducted for 75 participants (50 females, 24 males, and 1 other; 
Mage = 18.59 years, SD = 0.89). Participants were analyzed based on political identity. 
Those who indicated Democratic affiliation were included in analyses. Those who 
indicated Republican affiliation (N = 25) or marked other (N = 26) were excluded. 
Analysis focused on self-identified Democratic participants because liberal participants 
were easier to recruit on a college campus, which ensured a large enough sample size and 
made comparisons between groups difficult (as there was a dramatically uneven number 
per group). Further, the focus on one political party reduced the chance for noise in the 
data because non-Democratic participants did not behave consistently in a pilot sample. 
All participants gave informed consent in compliance with the human subject regulations 
of the University of Texas at Austin. 
PROCEDURE 
Participants evaluated the personality traits of well-known politicians. In each 
trial, participants saw a picture of a politician, the politician’s political party affiliation, 
and a prompt to if they believed each politician possessed a particular trait (Figure 10). 
Participants were given a two-alternative forced choice task (i.e., ‘yes’ or ‘no’) to rate all 
six politicians (three per political party: Republican and Democratic) on each of 60 trait 
words (30 per valence: positive and negative). Trait words were taken from a list of 
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words standardized for valence (Anderson, 1968). Politicians were matched for age and 
gender across party to control for visual and social features of the stimuli. Democratic 
politicians consisted of Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders, and Wendy Davis. Republican 
politicians consisted of Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, and Sarah Palin. In a pilot test of this 
evaluation procedure, Democratic and Republican participants reported significantly 
different evaluations of each of these politicians in all trait.   
Prior to entering the task, participants completed 10 practice trials that were 
identical to the full task with the exception that they were asked to rate different 
politicians. The practice trials ensured that participants understood how to complete the 
task before beginning the experiment. 
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Figure 10: Social Evaluation Task. Participants (prescreened for political affiliation) 
evaluated the positive and negative traits for 3 politicians from each of their 
in-group political party and out-group political party. The social evaluation 
task crossed Valence (positive, negative) with Party Affiliation (in group, 
out group). 
Drift Diffusion Modeling 
To determine the roles of prior expectations and preferential evidence 
accumulation in evaluating a liked or disliked other, Drift Diffusion Modeling (DDM) 
was employed. DDM is beneficial in this context because it allows for understanding of 
underlying mechanisms that would otherwise be difficult to assess with self-report or 
reaction time data alone. Self-report is problematic because people are largely unable to 
introspect about the internal mechanisms that lead to their decisions (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Especially given that this research pertains to motivational biases and people are 
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blind to their own biases, it would be difficult to trust any introspection about their 
decision making processes (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002; Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 
2005). Reaction time data is also problematic because reaction times could be fast of 
slow due to prior expectations or preferential evidence accumulation. For example, if 
asked to indicate if Obama is intelligent a participant may answer quickly because they 
have a prior expectation that he is or they could answer quickly because they have a rapid 
rate of evidence accumulation. While DDM uses both self-report and reaction time, it 
further utilizes distributions of reaction times to calculate the underlying processes. By 
understanding when certain decisions are more frequently made within an RT 
distribution, decisions resulting from prior expectations can be teased apart from 
decisions resulting from preferential evidence accumulation. 
DDM data analysis was conducted using fast-dm to calculate starting point (z) 
and drift rate (v) (Voss & Voss, 2007). Starting point indicates the prior expectations that 
participants have and thus how likely they are to endorse a rating as true or false. The 
drift rate indicates how much participants are engaging in preferential evidence 
accumulation before endorsing the trait as true or false. While DDM was originally used 
in paradigms that had correct and incorrect decisions, some recent research has shown 
that it can be applied to paradigms in which decisions are a matter of subjective 
preference with no right or wrong answer (Flagan, Mumford, & Beer, 2017; Krajbich, 
Lu, Camerer, & Rangel, 2012; Milosavljevic, Malmaud, Huth, Koch, & Rangel, 2010). In 
this paradigm starting point is a proxy for desired directional conclusion. In other words, 
before they have evaluated the politician they already have a direction in which they 
desire for their evaluation to go. It is important to note that starting point is a necessary, 
but not sufficient marker of possessing directional conclusions as starting point may 
reflect prior cognitive appraisals rather than motivation, per se. Further, drift rate 
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indicates the rate or depth of searching through memory prior to making a decision. 
Differences between conditions in this paradigm relate to participants’ subjective feelings 
and participants only have their own memories to process, so differences in drift rate 
must reflect differences in depth of processing their own memories. 
Behavioral Analysis 
Data analysis included calculating differences in raw ratings, starting points, and 
evidence accumulation. All three indices were estimated for each of the four conditions 
(Democrat-Positive, Republican-Negative, Democrat-Negative, Republican-Positive). 
We analyzed raw ratings in a 2 (Valence: Positive and Negative) by 2 (Politician: 
Democrat and Republican) within-subjects ANOVA to test if participants behaved 
consistently with their self-expressed political views.  
Drift rates were analyzed in a 2 (Valence: Positive and Negative) by 2 (Politician: 
Democrat and Republican) within-subjects ANOVA to test differences in rates of 
accumulating evidence before giving a response.  
Starting points were analyzed in two separate ways. First, a 2 (Valence: Positive 
and Negative) by 2 (Politician: Democrat and Republican) within-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to test if there were differences between conditions in prior expectations. 
Further, a one-sample t-test was used to compare starting points in each condition to the 
center point. Starting points at the center point (z = 0.5) indicate that the participant has 
no prior expectations toward affirming or denying. Starting points closer to 0 indicate that 
the participant has a prior expectation of affirming the trait as true of that politician and 
starting points closer to 1 indicate that the participant has a prior expectation of denying 
the trait as true of that politician. 
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Study 4 Results 
Raw Rating Scores. As hypothesized, liberal participants rated Democratic 
politicians and Republican politicians consistently with their political views 
(Valence*Political Affiliation: F(1,74) = 707.28, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.905; see Figure 11). 
There was no main effect of Political Affiliation (F(1,74 ) = 2.774, p = 0.10, ηp2 = 0.036), 
but there was a main effect of Valence (F (1,74) = 74.625, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.502).  
 
  
Figure 11: Raw Rating Scores. Participants rated politicians in accordance with their 
political leanings. Liberal participants rated Democratic politicians more 
positively and less negatively and Republican politicians less positively and 
more negatively. 
Evidence Accumulation. Drift rates differed for positive and negative trait 
ratings, but only within the in-group condition. There was an interaction of political 
affiliation and trait valence on drift rates (Valence*Political Affiliation: F(1,74) = 9.81, p 
=0.002, ηp2 = 0.117; see Figure 12). Participants had lower drift rates, indicating more 
deep processing, when rating Democrats positively (M = 1.19, SD = 0.55) than when 
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rating Democrats negatively (M = 1.35, SD = 0.49; t(74) = -3.698, p < 0.001, d = 0.427). 
However, participants had similar drift rates when rating Republicans negatively (M = 
0.67, SD = 0.52) and when rating Republicans positively (M = 0.75, SD = 0.50; t(74) = 
1.581, p = 0.118, d = 0.183). There was a main effect of Political Affiliation (F(1,74) = 
82.17, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.526), but no main effect of Valence (F(1,74) = 2.369, p = 0.128, 
ηp2 = 0.031).  
 
  
Figure 12: Drift Rates. Liberal participants had  larger drift rates (more shallow 
processing) when evaluating Democratic politicians than when evaluating 
Republican politicians. There was also an interaction effect such that they 
had  smaller drift rates when evaluating Democratic politicians positively as 
compared to negatively. 
Starting Point. Participants started with prior expectations for rating Democrats 
with positive traits and Republicans with negative traits, but they did not have prior 
expectations for rating Democrats with negative traits and Republicans positive traits 
(Valence*Political Affiliation: F(1,74) = 13.45, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.154; see Figure 13). 
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There was no main effect of Valence (F(1,74) = 0.40, p = 0.53, ηp2 = 0.005) or of 
Political Affiliation (F(1,74) = 2.02, p = 0.16, ηp2 = 0.027). Starting point for rating 
Democrats positively (M = 0.44, SD = 0.11) and Republicans negatively (M = 0.44, SD = 
0.12) were different than the middle point (t(74) = -4.86, p < 0.001, d = -0.80; t(74) = -
4.14, p < 0.001, d = -0.68). However, starting point for rating Democrats negatively (M = 
0.50, SD = 0.09) and Republicans positively (M = 0.52, SD = 0.12) were not different 
than the middle point (t(74) = -0.13, p = 0.898, d = -0.02; t(74) = 1.23, p = 0.225, d = 
0.20).   
 
 
Figure 13: Starting Points. Liberal participants had starting points that were 
significantly different than the midpoint (blue, dashed line) when they 
evaluated Democrats positively and Republicans negatively. 
Study 4 Discussion 
Study 4 results suggest that biased memory searches occur when aiming to paint a 
social target in a flattering but not in an unflattering light. Participants had different drift 
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rates for positive and negative evaluations in the in-group condition, but not in the out-
group condition. This suggests that, given a desire to paint someone in an unflattering 
light (i.e., negative trait ratings of Trump), people did not employ biased memory 
searching to help them achieve making that evaluation. Starting point data suggests that 
rating out-group members on negative traits and in-group members on positive traits was 
consistent with participants’ desired directional conclusions. Participants only expressed 
prior expectations (i.e., starting points different than the midpoint) when the evaluation 
question was consistent with their political views. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that liberals do have a desired directional conclusion toward identifying 
Obama as intelligent and Trump as greedy. However, reaching the desired directional 
conclusion that Trump is greedy did not seem to be supported by biased memory 
searching.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current research offers support for the role of biased searching through 
memories as one cognitive mechanism underlying motivated social evaluation. Previous 
literature has been unable to illuminate the role of biased searching through memory 
because it has failed to operationalize the underlying mechanisms, it has conflated 
asymmetrical memory reporting with desired directional conclusions, and it has focused 
on the role of biased memory searching only in situations where people’s directional 
conclusions are flattering. The current research utilized computational modeling methods 
(SDT and DDM) to operationalize underlying memory mechanisms, used financial and 
psychological incentives to test the role of desired directional conclusions, and employed 
a novel paradigm to understand the role of biased memory searching when aiming to 
paint a social target in an unflattering as well as a flattering light. In Study 1, recognition 
thresholds for negative feedback remained relatively more conservative even when 
memory was incentivized through decreased self-relevance or decreased self-relevance 
and opportunity for financial gain. Study 2 suggested that it is possible to incentivize 
more equivalent recognition thresholds across positive and negative feedback but only 
when self-relevance is decreased and a financial incentive is presented before encoding 
takes place. Study 3 investigated neurophysiological signatures to more fully characterize 
processing within the negative feedback condition. Results suggest that 
neurophysiological associations with self-reported forgotten negative feedback are better 
characterized by ‘forgotten memories’ than ‘suppressed knowledge.’ Moreover, study 4 
showed that biased memory searches may only support the desire to paint a social target 
in a flattering light, but not when the desired directional conclusion is to paint a social 
target in an unflattering light. Taken together, results from Studies 1-4 suggest that biased 
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searching through memory is one cognitive process that supports flattering social 
evaluations about the self and others and that social evaluations that have previously been 
assumed to be motivated are in fact likely the result of aiming to reach a desired 
directional conclusion. Further, the results have implications for thinking about self-
processing as well as future directions to more fully understand the role of biased 
memory searching in motivated social evaluations. 
Implications for the role of biased searches through memory in social 
evaluation 
The current research builds on prior research by utilizing computational modeling 
to more fully understand the role of biased memory searching in motivated social 
evaluations. Previous research often did not operationalize the underlying mechanisms 
involved in motivated social evaluation, so it has been unclear if biased searches through 
memory could explain motivated social evaluation phenomena as some researchers have 
suggested (Showers & Cantor, 1985; Kunda, 1990, Dunning, 2015). While there are 
certainly many other cognitive processes which may support motivated social evaluation, 
the current research suggests the critical role that biased memory searching plays.  
Studies 1-3 show that differences in memory for positive and negative 
information are driven by different standards for claiming recognition. The use of Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT) allowed for understanding the underlying components of 
thresholds for claiming recognition and ability to discern previously seen words from 
completely novel words. Further, it seems that previous research utilizing proportion 
recognized or recalled was capturing less conservative thresholds for claiming 
recognition and less accuracy of positive compared to negative feedback. Results from 
Study 4 suggest that people engage more deeply in biased memory searches when they 
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want to make flattering, but not unflattering, social evaluations. However, it should be 
noted that Study 4 analyses focused on self-identified Democrats which warrants caution 
in generalizing these results. Research does suggest that Democrats and Republicans 
exhibit similar biases when rating in-group and out-group members (Pew, 2016), but 
generalization should be met with caution. The results from computational modeling (i.e., 
location (c) from SDT and drift rate from DDM) in all four studies suggest that biased 
searching through memory is one cognitive process that may support motivated social 
evaluation. However, Study 4 results suggest that the role for biased memory searching 
may only support motivated social evaluation when aiming to paint a social target in a 
flattering light. 
The current research also finds that the role of biased memory searches at the time 
of recognition may be affected by or co-occurring with processes that occur as early as 
encoding. Study 2 shows that alternate incentives only work when incentives are 
presented prior to encoding and Study 3 further finds that negative feedback that is 
‘forgotten’ is not encoded in the first place rather than encoded but suppressed at the time 
of retrieval. Therefore, it seems that differences in standards for claiming recognition of 
positive and negative self-relevant information at the time of retrieval is occurring in 
conjunction with lower rates of encoding negative feedback. Taken together, the results 
of these studies show that biased searching through memories is involved in motivated 
social evaluation, and its involvement may supported by differences in encoding.  
Did the current research really look at instances of motivated social 
evaluation? 
One criticism of research on motivated social evaluation is that it fails to discount 
alternate, nonmotivated accounts for findings that can be interpreted from a motivated 
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perspective (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004).  Conversely, the self-enhancement account 
suggests that people possess a strong motivation to see the self in a positive light and that 
this self positivity motivation (and the resulting asymmetries in recognition thresholds) 
would be extremely difficult to override with other incentives. Results from Studies 1 and 
2 showing that asymmetries in recognition thresholds are resilient to competing 
incentives suggests these findings are consistent with a self-enhancement explanation of 
why people remember more flattering self-relevant information. This support for the self-
enhancement explanation suggests that the paradigm used in Studies 1-3 is appropriate 
for research aiming to understand the role of biased searches through memory. Further, 
the starting point findings from Study 4 also suggest that the evaluation of political 
figures on positive and negative traits is appropriate for studying the role of biased 
searches through memory in motivated social evaluation. Starting point findings suggest 
that people may be expressing desired directional conclusions to rate Democrats with 
positive traits and Republicans with negative traits (though, as noted earlier, starting point 
findings are not sufficient to conclusively suggest motivation).  
Implications for the long-term consequences of overly positive self-
evaluations 
Beyond speaking to the specific questions outlined in this dissertation, the current 
research has more broad implications for understanding self-processing. While it has 
been suggested that there are positive consequences of self-enhancement (Dufner, Reitz, 
& Zander, 2014), there have also been many negative consequences found. For example, 
previous research has suggested that self-enhancement in the academic domain (defined 
as self-perceptions that are more favorable than an objective measure of the self's 
qualities) can be associated with poor long-term outcomes such as lowered self-esteem 
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and reduced interest in academic environments (Robins & Beer, 2001). A prevalent 
explanation for the negative long-term consequences is that people eventually find 
themselves unable to suppress the retrieval of negative feedback, which leads to negative 
self-esteem. However, the research here suggests that people are not suppressing negative 
feedback because biased searching through memories partially stems from differences at 
encoding. ERP results suggest that which beliefs are available to access are constrained 
by which information is encoded in the first place. Further, it seems that shifting 
thresholds requires high levels of incentives suggesting that any negative feedback that is 
encoded would still be less likely to be identified as self-relevant. Incentives were only 
able to influence people to shift their thresholds for claiming recognition of positive and 
negative feedback when they were both psychological and financial, so it seems unlikely 
that over time the strong drive to see the self positively will diminish. Taken together, the 
results of Studies 1-3 suggest that long-term consequences are unlikely due to an inability 
to continuously suppress negative self-relevant information as suppression does not seem 
to be a mechanism supporting biased memory searches.  
Future directions and considerations 
While the current findings shed light on motivated social evaluations and the role 
of biased memory searches in such evaluations, there are still avenues for a deeper 
understanding in self-processing. Specifically, it is unclear if results from Study 4 would 
replicate given a self-evaluative paradigm. While study 4 utilized a person perception 
paradigm, the focus was on understanding the underlying role of biased memory searches 
in motivation to reach any desired directional conclusion and not just a flattering desired 
directional conclusion. It is difficult to draw conclusions or generalize about 
psychological processes when studying people who desire unflattering feedback about the 
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self because self-enhancement is such a strong and prevalent motivation and the desire 
for unflattering feedback can indicate psychological dysfunction. Therefore, the rating of 
political figures paradigm was used as a situation in which people may typically have 
strong motivations toward unflattering evaluations. Now that there is a foundation for 
understanding, we could explore more deeply how biased memory searches would work 
within self-evaluation. One possible future direction that could build on the current 
research would be to manipulate people’s mindsets regarding self-relevant feedback. 
While self-enhancement is a strong and prevalent self-perception motivation, there are 
other motivations people may have at different times or may be experimentally induced 
to have (Taylor, Netter, & Wayment, 1995). One motivation that may make people less 
motivated toward positive self-relevant feedback is self-improvement. In a self-
improvement mindset a person has a goal to become better in a certain domain. For 
example, someone who would like to improve their grade in a class may be more 
interested in receiving any feedback (positive or negative) about their performance on a 
paper or exam in order to perform better on future assignments. In such a mindset, all 
feedback is valuable because positive feedback allows you to know what you are doing 
well and negative feedback allows you to understand where changes are needed. Future 
research could manipulate people’s mindsets about the value of negative feedback to 
understand how depth of processing may vary given a self-processing paradigm. If 
people have no strong preference toward flattering feedback, would they exhibit equal 
depths of memory searching for flattering and unflattering self-relevant information?   
While the discussion thus far has focused on neurotypical populations, the current 
findings may also have implications for people affected by psychological pathologies. 
Specifically, we know that people with depression and low self-esteem tend to have 
negative self-views and rather than seeking positive feedback they aim to verify those 
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self-views by seeking negative feedback (Swann, 1983; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 
1992). The current and extant research has largely focused on the positive end of the 
spectrum. How would the specific indices measured here apply to a paradigm looking at 
self-evaluation in those affected by depression? Study 4 results suggest that biased 
memory searching does not operate the same way when desired directional conclusions 
are toward unflattering evaluations. However, research on those with depression does 
show differences in how positive and negative stimuli are processed and remembered 
(Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). It could be that not all motivations toward making unflattering 
evaluations are the same and this difference between wanting to see an other negatively 
and wanting to see the self- negatively needs more exploration. Or, it could be that depth 
of processing has been defined differently when exploring the role of depression in 
memory biases. In that case, utilizing DDM in a paradigm examining self-evaluation 
tendencies in those with depression might reveal new insights about the cognitive 
processes associated with this psychological disorder.  
Conclusions 
The roles of biased searches through memory and desired directional conclusions 
have been posited as supporting social evaluation. However, the support for their roles 
has been limited due to a lack of operationalizing underlying mechanisms of memory, 
conflation of memory asymmetries for positive and negative feedback with desire to see 
someone in a positive light, and an emphasis or focus on flattering evaluations rather than 
any desired directional conclusion. The current research utilized novel paradigms as well 
as computational modeling to allow for a deeper understanding of the roles of biased 
memory searches and desired directional conclusions in social evaluations. Biased belief 
searching is one cognitive mechanism that supports motivated social evaluation. 
 59 
Computational modeling revealed two ways that biased memory searches could support 
motivated social evaluation: differential standards for claiming recognition and depth of 
processing when searching through memory. Further, theories that suggest a role for 
directional conclusions (rather than nonmotivated perspectives such as fluency) can 
account for differences in people’s propensity to claim recognition of positive 
information at a greater rate than negative information about the self. Psychological and 
financial incentives were unable to diminish the difference between thresholds for 
claiming recognition of positive and negative self-relevant feedback except when the 
highest measured level of incentives were offered before encoding to recognize feedback 
about an other. Further, the results from these four studies shed light on the mechanisms 
that support motivated social evaluations and offer future avenues to explore with regards 
to self-evaluation.  
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